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Abstract
This paper takes a broad view on the notion of focus. It calls into question the idea
that focus is a unitary, cross-linguistically applicable notion and also questions the
implicit metatheoretical reasoning that apparently leads linguists of various schools
to posit such a thing. A comparison of the Hungarian ‘focus position’ with the
English it-cleft provides a case study of how even considerable similarity of form
and function may spring from independent origins. This is accompanied by brief
demonstrations of more blatant diversity in ‘focusing’ phenomena.
1 Introduction
There is a popular perception among linguists (directly reflected in textbook presenta-
tions like that in Saeed, 1997) that there is a single notion of focus that can be associated
with a variety of grammatical phenomena in different languages. Commonly cited ex-
amples include focal pitch accenting in English (as in (1)), Hungarian ‘focus movement’
(as in (2)) and focus morphemes in Somali (as in (3)):
(1) a. [What did Susan drink?]
Susan drank GIN. / #SUSAN drank gin.
b. [Who drank gin?]
#Susan drank GIN. / SUSAN drank gin.
(2) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meghı´vta
VM-called
Marit.
Mari-ACC
‘Ja´nos invited Mari.’
b. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
hı´vta
called
meg.
VM
‘Ja´nos invited MARI.’ / ‘It’s MARI who Ja´nos invited.’
(3) a. Amina
Amina
wargeyskii
newspaper
baa-y
FOC-she
keentay.
brought
‘Amina brought THE NEWSPAPER.’
b. Amina
Amina
baa
FOC
wargeyskii
newspaper
keentay.
brought
‘AMINA brought the newspaper.’
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All of these phenomena appear to involve those aspects of meaning that are said to be
characteristic of ‘focus’: in particular, some relationship to the expression of ‘new’ in-
formation and/or contrast, and the involvement of the intuitively somehow related notion
of sets of alternatives. Given such similarity of meaning, it is tempting to suggest that
all of the phenomena in (1)–(3) are driven by, or sensitive to, a particular grammatical
feature—call it [+focus]—which has a cross-linguistically consistent semantic correlate.
This is indeed a popular assumption. One school of thought in the Chomskyan ‘universal
grammar’ tradition even ties this feature to a particular syntactic functional projection in
the left periphery of underlying sentence structure (see Rizzi, 1997, and note the cru-
cial role of Hungarian ‘focus movement’ in motivating this proposal). While it is not
clear that this particular proposal is intended to account for prosodic focusing as in (1),
it does illustrate the depth of the assumption that focus may be treated as a grammatical
primitive with universal applicability—a truly fundamental notion, then1.
In spite of this popular perception of the status of focus, it is easy to show that—
at least in the implied, superficial way—(1)–(3) do not involve varying grammatical
expressions of a single meaning (let alone a single feature). It is a commonplace of the
literature on the Hungarian ‘focus position’ that, despite its name, the occupants of this
position do not simply correspond to those expressions that carry focal pitch accenting
in English. Instead, the relevant Hungarian syntactic position is generally said to host
‘exhaustive focus’ or ‘identificational focus’ (see, for example, Szabolcsi, 1981, 1994;
E´. Kiss, 1998; Horvath, 2000). It is often claimed that this makes the Hungarian ‘focus
position’ more similar to an English it-cleft construction than to English accent-based
focusing. The accuracy or otherwise of such claims is discussed below, but it is at least
clear that this syntactic phenomenon in Hungarian cannot be simply assumed to provide
evidence for a grammatical primitive that also drives English focal accenting.
Similar observations may be made with regard to the Somali ‘focus morpheme’
exemplified in (3). Like the Hungarian phenomenon, it may bear sufficient interpretive
similarities to English focal accenting to have been given the name ‘focus morpheme’
by linguists, but more detailed consideration shows it to have quite different properties
too.
Such cases are merely illustrative of a broader cross-linguistic picture. Phenom-
ena to which the term ‘focus’ has been applied are by no means homogeneous. Some
are very clearly distinct from general definitions of focus, with decidedly idiosyncratic
properties. Others may illustrate common cross-linguistic tendencies, but close compar-
ison shows that significant differences may exist even between superficially very similar
constructions and that such cases may require an analysis whereby distinct mechanisms
happen to produce similar results.
This calls into question any simple form of universal structure-meaning mapping
that is driven by a unitary focus feature. One might then retreat to a position whereby
focus phenomena are accepted to be diverse in many ways, but to share certain core
1Note that the object of my arguments is not merely the idea of [+focus] as a universal syntactic
feature. Not all proposals that reify focus would do so in this particular way. My point is to question any
conception of a unitary ‘focus’ as a universal category in human language. Indeed, what is common to all
such universalist positions is arguably the idea that there is a universal semantico-pragmatic category of
focus, so this might be seen as my primary target.
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elements (perhaps a core set of features that may be combined and recombined to pro-
duce a variety of effects cross-linguistically). However, even this is questionable in the
case of focus. For one thing, those elements of meaning that seem to crop up regularly
in putative focusing phenomena relate to such fundamental aspects of communication
that one must ask whether they need to be considered part of the grammar at all, in any
given case, let alone ascribed to universal grammatical primitives. In section 4, I also
briefly consider more philosophical arguments for positing universal (or otherwise cross-
linguistic) categories like focus, and suggest that appeals to scientific methodology do
not suffice to justify this practice.
2 Starting to lose focus: Hungarian ‘focus movement’
and English clefts
If focus were shown to drive syntactic movement this might lend significant support to
the idea that focus is a primitive grammatical notion. However, as mentioned above,
it has long been observed that Hungarian ‘focus movement’ does not occur in all and
only those circumstances where focal pitch accenting arises in English. Commonly, the
claim in the literature on Hungarian is that the ‘focus position’ (henceforth FP—the scare
quotes remaining, implicitly) conveys ‘exhaustivity’ or ‘identification’, like an English
it-cleft, whereas English accenting may convey simply ‘information update’. Thus, FP
constructions are often translated in linguistic work with an it-cleft, as in (2). Moreover,
this apparent parallelismwith the it-cleft has led to a distinct kind of universalist analysis:
that there is a common underlying syntactic structure to FP and the it-cleft, even if focal
accenting has a different basis (E´. Kiss, 1998, 1999).
Irrespective of universal or language-specific claims, the conventional way to ac-
count for the Hungarian ‘focus position’ has in recent years been to assume the existence
of some dedicated functional projection (‘FocusP’) whose contribution to compositional
semantics is an ‘exhaustivity operator’ (Szabolcsi, 1981) or an ‘identificational operator’
(Kenesei, 1986; Szabolcsi, 1994):
(4) Exhaustivity operator: λx [λP [P(X) ∧ ∀y [P(y) → y= x]]]
(5) Identificational operator: λx [λP [x= ιy [P(y)]]]
The assumption in all such work is therefore that some notion of uniqueness, contrast or
exclusion constitutes the core semantics of this syntactic position, the difference between
the exhaustive and identificational approaches being a matter of whether this uniqueness
or contrast is thereby asserted or presupposed.
Evidence that FP does not introduce an assertion of uniqueness (as in (4)) is
provided by the contrast between (6)(7-a) and (6)(7-b)2. This exploits the fact that Hun-
garian can use a plural-marked version (kik) of the question word ki ‘who’. It might be
expected that a singular noun phrase would be acceptable in response to a kik-question
2This example is due to Balogh (2005) (who uses it to reach different conclusions); see Wedgwood
(2005, 137) for a separate demonstration that FP does not contribute an assertion of exhaustification, which
is in turn based on work on the English it-cleft by Horn (1981).
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iff it is accompanied by some explicit assertion of exhaustivity/uniqueness, which would
in effect cancel the expectation of a plural noun phrase. (6)(7-a) shows that this is indeed
the case: kik (‘who-plural’) can be felicitously answered with csak Anna (‘only Anna’).
(6)(7-b) shows that the use of FP does not have the same effect. Since it thus fails to have
the effects predicted of an assertion of uniqueness, we must conclude that this syntactic
position does not inherently introduce such an assertion3.
(6) Kik hı´vta´k fel Emilt?
who-PL called.PL VM Emil-ACC
‘Who called Emil?’
(7) a. #Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
b. Csak
only
Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
Therefore, if we are to account for FP in terms of the direct association of a syntactic pro-
jection with a semantic operator, the latter must be the presuppositional ‘identificational’
operator4.
For the time being, then, let us accept this identificational operator analysis. For
present purposes, the important question is then to what extent this has any connection
to traditional notions of focus, such as might be encapsulated in any putative universal
focus feature. As I outline below, the evidence suggests that the usage and interpretation
of FP sometimes has parallels with English prosodic focus but in other ways is clearly
not the same. At the same time, it resembles the English it-cleft in many ways, but not
perfectly.
Before going further, let me make clear that any genuine parallel with the it-cleft
militates against the idea that the ‘focus position’ lives up to its name (in the sense of
bearing any similarity to focal accenting). Clarification is necessary here, since clefts are
3There are two ways to interpret (6), both of which have the same force with regard to the putative
semantics of FP. The first interpretation is that offered in the main text: on the assumption that csak
has essentially quantificational exhaustive semantics, (6)(7-a) shows how an exhaustive assertion cancels
expectations of plurality, and (6)(7-b) shows that FP alone is incapable of doing so and therefore does
not inherently convey an exhaustive assertion. The second interpretation would be in terms of a recent
trend in the literature on only (e.g. Beaver and Clark, 2008, and two talks at the Stuttgart workshop)
which claims that part of the semantics of such ‘exclusive’ items is that they are ‘mirative’: they cancel
expectations. Balogh (2005) suggests that this is sufficient to explain the contrast in (6) while preserving
exhaustive semantics for FP. But the question remains why FP in this case does not also have mirative
properties. Beaver and Clark argue that ‘exclusives’ as a class are mirative. The crucial point here is
that asserting exhaustification amounts to an act of exclusion. Therefore, by either interpretation of the
semantics of csak/only, we should see ‘mirative’ effects in (6)(7-b) if exhaustification were encoded in
FP as in (4). Note that this does not rule out the involvement of exhaustivity/uniqueness as some form of
presupposition in the interpretation of FP, as argued below.
4With the exception of Kenesei (1986) and Szabolcsi (1994), this seemingly rather significant point has
been somewhat glossed over in the literature on Hungarian: E´. Kiss (1998, 2002) speaks of ‘identificational
focus’ but provides only an informal definition of its semantics, which appears to equivocate between the
assertional and presuppositional analyses, while Horvath’s recent (2000; 2007) proposals continue the
tradition of opposing a general, ‘information update’ type of focus with what is effectively an assertion of
exhaustivity, without considering a presuppositional analysis.
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sometimes thought of as focusing devices. This is not the case, as a number of analysts
have pointed out in the past. It is plain that whatever focal pitch accenting contributes
to meaning must be orthogonal to whatever clefting contributes, since pitch accents may
be shifted around within an English cleft sentence, with concomitant changes in inter-
pretation. Thus, in addition to the ‘citation form’ it-cleft in (8) (what Prince, 1978 calls
a ‘stressed focus’ cleft and Hedberg, 1990 calls a ‘topic clause’ cleft), we find cases like
(9) (which Prince terms an ‘informative presupposition’ cleft and Hedberg calls a ‘com-
ment clause’ cleft). Indeed, Delin’s (1989) corpus study finds the latter kind to be more
common in texts.
(8) Debbie’s been trying to take the credit for my tango-dancing prize. But it’s
HARRY who taught me to tango.
(9) A: Why are you so fond of Harry?
B: Because it’s Harry who taught me to TANGO.
Consequently, if the Hungarian ‘focus position’ truly resembles the it-cleft, it cannot be
a manifestation of the same ‘focus’ that putatively underlies focal pitch accenting; on
the other hand, if it truly resembles focal accenting in any significant way, then it cannot
be identical to the it-cleft. The worst situation for any universalist analysis is therefore
one in which the Hungarian phenomenon shows significant similarities to both of the
English phenomena—and this is what we find.
On the one hand, FP bears close parallels to the it-cleft. As already noted, it
is typically associated with contrastive or exhaustive readings, just as the it-cleft is. It
also precludes a classic ‘topic-comment’ (or ‘VP-focus’) reading of the sentence (a point
made by Lambrecht, 2001 regarding clefts)—i.e. one in which everything except a single
argument or adjunct is ‘in focus’ by traditional definitions such as passing the question-
answer heuristic. In this respect, FP and the it-cleft are quite unlike focal accenting,
which is commonly reckoned to allow for the expression of ‘VP-focus’ via placement of
an accent on the rightmost argument within that VP, as in (10):
(10) A: What did John do?
B: John [F kissed MARY].
A sentence like B’s contribution in (10) would not be felicitously translated in to Hun-
garian using FP, though it plainly involves focal pitch accenting, which relates to the
crucial focus heuristic of answering aWh-question.
Moreover, it is as true of the Hungarian ‘focus position’ as of English clefts that
the locus of information update may be found at various points in the sentence. (11) is an
attested example of a ‘focus position’ sentence that parallels ‘comment-clause’ it-clefts:
(11) Nagyon
much
szeretek
love-1SG
fa´t
wood-ACC
va´gni.
chop-INF
Ha
if
csak
only
lehet,
may.be
[fava´ga´ssal]
woodchopping-with
kezdem
start-1SG
a
the
napot.
day-ACC
‘I love to cut wood. If possible, it’s with wood-cutting that I start the day.’
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It is plain, then, that FP could not be said to host all and only focused material, if ‘focused
material’ is taken to bear any relation to that which is focally accented in English and/or
that which is in focus according to question-answer heuristics.
On the other hand, the Hungarian ‘focus position’ shows certain important dif-
ferences to English it-clefts. Notably, there is a significant connection between the use
of FP and question-answer coherence. Specifically, when the ‘answer’ part of a sentence
happens to be just the size of a single, structurally simple noun phrase or adjunct—i.e.
in cases traditionally called ‘narrow focus’ (or Lambrecht’s ‘argument focus’)—the un-
marked sentence form uses FP, as shown in (12).
(12) Ki
who
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt?
Emil-ACC
‘Who called Emil?’
a. Anna
Anna
hı´vta
called
fel
VM
Emilt.
Emil-ACC
b. ?? (Anna) felhı´vta (Anna) Emilt (Anna).
This is quite unlike the English it-cleft, which is by no means an unmarked way to
answer such a question, let alone the unmarked way.
There seems little chance, then, of unifying Hungarian ‘focus position’ with any
notion of focus that could be at work in the grammar of English: the semantic contri-
bution of the Hungarian position cuts across what must be different notions in English
(cleft-presuppositionality and focus as conveyed by accent). Consequently, there is no
common [+focus] feature to be found here, even though there are undoubtedly various
comparable elements of both structure and semantico-pragmatic effect.
2.1 Similar effects; different causes
Since we have just concluded that the Hungarian ‘focus position’ is not functionally just
the same as the English it-cleft, it is worth also noting that the Hungarian construction
doesn’t look quite like a cleft structurally.
Once again, there certainly are some striking superficial similarities: in both con-
structions a ‘left-peripheral’ noun phrase (or similarly sized expression) is lent some
special status and commonly carries some form of pitch accent, while the rest of the sen-
tence appears to be given a presuppositional reading of some kind. On the other hand,
there are very notable differences. In particular, the Hungarian ‘focus position’ doesn’t
involve those defining characteristics of cleft constructions, (i) a copula verb whose sub-
ject is some form of pronominal and (ii) a relative clause5. Note further that Hungarian
does use other, more cleft-like constructions, as in the (attested) example (13), a fairly
clear indication that FP is not simply this language’s way of realising some universally
available, underlyingly cleft-like structure6.
5Note that while Hungarian has a null copula in the present tense, this is not the reason for the lack of
a visible copula in FP sentences: the past tense copula is non-null and does not appear in such sentences.
6Indeed, this example shows not only an overt cleft structure in the main clause but also an FP structure
in the subordinate clause that would not be felicitously translated with an English it-cleft.
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(13) . . . e´desanya´m
mother-1SG
volt
was
az,
that
aki
who
a
the
munkahelye´n
workplace-in
magasabb
superior
pozı´cio´t
position-ACC
to¨lto¨tt
fill
be.
in(VM)
‘{It was my mother who / My mother was the one who} occupied the superior
position in the workplace.’
Nevertheless, we have also seen that the it-cleft and the ‘focus position’ do regularly look
alike to a very considerable extent (and on-going work with corpus-derived data suggest
that the interpretive parallels stretch into areas of meaning that have not previously been
considered in this connection).
What this suggests is a very natural kind of situation, but one which linguists
often seem rather unhappy to recognise: rather than different manifestations of some
underlying shared core, we simply have close resemblance across distinct phenomena.
This is of course a very common situation in all kinds of extra-linguistic domains; sim-
ple examples from everyday experience include fluorescent, candescent and LED-based
light bulbs, which these days can all look very similar both on the shop shelves and in
use, or plasma screen and LCD-screen televisions. In both of these examples, quite dis-
tinct kinds of underlying technology produce strikingly similar results in terms of both
function and superficial form. In a parallel fashion, there are many instances in the nat-
ural world of resemblances of both form and function that we know to have different
origins, both in the evolutionary sense and in the sense of the ‘synchronic’ mechanisms
involved. Different kinds of eye or wing found across animal species provide obvious
examples (about which more below).
What, then, might be the particular mechanisms involved in the it-cleft and the
Hungarian ‘focus position’ respectively, such that these are underlyingly distinct but
produce just the degree of similarity that we observe?
My proposal is in part based on taking the surface-structural properties of the
two constructions seriously. I assume that the it-cleft has relatively straightforward,
compositional semantics: a presupposition of the existence of some unique entity is
introduced through the use of a pronominal subject and this entity is identified as one
that bears a certain property or properties through the use of the copula verb. This
leads naturally to essentially the meaning expressed in the ‘identificational operator’
analysis of the Hungarian ‘focus position’, as given in (5) above. I further propose
that this Hungarian construction also takes on this meaning as a result not of an atomic
‘operator’ that we stipulate to form part of the grammar, but rather as a result of more
basic semantic operations. As I outline below, the details of the interpretations of the
English and Hungarian constructions are closely related, but they are not identical. In
the Hungarian case, interpreting the relevant construction is not such a transparently
compositional process.
Both sides of this analysis involve controversial elements, which I can only
briefly allude to here. The idea that the it-cleft has broadly transparent compositional
semantics goes against a common assumption that the subject it is merely an expletive
element. However, a growing number of analysts now recognise that this is not the case:
the it of the it-cleft may not have all the characteristics of a full pronoun (such as number
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and gender agreement), but nor is it typical of expletive elements (see Bolinger, 1972;
Borkin, 1984; Hedberg, 1990, 2000; Geurts and van der Sandt, 2004). Crucially (as ob-
served by Geurts and van der Sandt), the same necessarily neuter pronoun appears in all
identificational copula sentences, not only clefts, as in Guess who I saw at the swimming
pool? It / *He was Alfred Tarski!. It seems reasonable to suggest that the lack of gender
and number agreement on this pronoun relates to the very fact that it denotes something
that requires identification, and as such carries minimal semantic specification itself. In
any case, it is clear that this it maintains those elements of full pronouns that are crucial
to the present argument: definiteness and its associated presuppositions of existence and
uniqueness.
My analysis of FP is essentially that of Wedgwood (2005) (and a relative of that
of E´. Kiss, 2006, 2008), which again can only be presented in rough outline here. The
core of the proposal is that the occupant of FP itself (which I define as the expression
immediately left-adjacent to the tensed element in the sentence, whose occupancy is
accompanied by the postposing of any otherwise pre-verbal ‘verbal modifier’ element
in the sentence) must be interpreted as the ‘main predicate’ of the sentence. Unlike
most analysts, I assume that all of the following occupy the same syntactic position: a
‘syntactic focus’, a verbal modifier when in its unmarked, pre-tense position, and a main
verb in its unmarked pre-tense position7.
Evidence for this is found in the behaviour of infinitival main verbs in the pres-
ence of an auxiliary verb (and hence morphologically free of the expression of tense).
(14) shows how the main verb then seems to ‘compete’ with any verbal modifier (such as
the particle meg) for the pre-tense position, just as foci seem to. Still more significantly,
the presence of a ‘syntactic focus’ causes an infinitival main verb to postpose, as in (15).
(14) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
la´tni
see-INF
fogja
will
Marit.
Mari-ACC
‘Ja´nos will see Mari.’
b. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meg
VM
fogja
will
{hı´vni
call-INF
Marit
Mari-ACC
/ Marit
Mari-ACC
hı´vni}.
call-INF
‘Ja´nos will invite Mari.’
c. #Ja´nos
Ja´nos
meghı´vni
VM
fogja
will
Marit.
call-INF Mari-ACC
Intended: ‘Ja´nos will invite Mari.’
(15) a. Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
fogja
will
la´tni.
see-INF
‘It’s Mari who Ja´nos will see.’
b. *Ja´nos
Ja´nos
MARIT
Mari-ACC
la´tni
see-INF
fogja.
will
Intended: ‘It’s Mari who Ja´nos will see.’
7Note that in Wedgwood (2005) I argue for an approach to syntax based on linear processing, in the
manner of Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001; Cann et al., 2005); hence, I am not claiming here that
main verbs, verbal modifiers and ‘foci’ move to the same syntactic projection in the sense of conventional
frameworks, nor that they necessarily could.
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Given this, my claim is that a requirement that the occupant of the position in question be
interpreted as the main predicate predicts the different readings that are associated with
different kinds of expression in this position. That is, it is predicted that a main verb or
verbal modifier in this position will generally trigger an unmarked, ‘topic-commment’
reading, while the appearance of a noun phrase in this position will trigger a cleft-like
‘identificational’ reading.
The basic reasoning behind the first part of this is straightforward enough: a verb
is inherently predicative and in fact carries sufficiently rich structured semantic material
(in the form of argument and event structure) that applying this predicate to some referent
(given also some temporal anchor) can in itself constitute a fully propositional property-
ascription. Similar reasoning applies to the Hungarian ‘verbal modifiers’, which are
clearly in some sense intrinsically predicative elements, though here the arguments are
relatively complex (see Wedgwood, 2005, Chapter 7).
Other expressions, such as ordinary definite or indefinite noun phrases, are not
thought of as being inherently predicative. What, then, should we predict when such
an expression appears in a position that requires its occupant to take on a predicative
reading? An answer may be sought in Partee’s (1987) type-shifting principles. The type-
theoretic equivalent of lending a predicative reading to an individual-denoting expression
would of course be a shift from type 〈e〉 to type 〈e, t〉, an operation that Partee notably
calls ident and which amounts to the shift exemplified in (16)8:
(16) mary′ → λx. x=mary′
(‘interpret Mary as the set of things that are Mary’)
The informal English paraphrase given in (16) hints at where my argument is going: the
result of requiring an individual-denoting expression to be read as a predicate is precisely
to introduce an identificational element to the semantics of that expression. We are no
longer merely dealing with Mary, but rather with those things (or more plausibly that
thing) that can be identified as being Mary.
From this point, the full ‘identificational’ reading of ‘focus position’ sentences
follows—not as a matter of strict logical necessity, but by reasonable inferences nev-
ertheless. An act of identification implies the existence of something to be identified,
whence the presuppositional element to the identificational reading. Just what is pre-
supposed is determined by the rest of the sentence. Essentially, the predicate that is the
‘focus position’ expression needs a term to predicate over and also needs to be made to
relate in some coherent way to the rest of the material in the sentence in which it appears.
Both of these issues are resolved if we take the rest of the sentence to be what is iden-
tified by the ident-style predication—thus fullfilling the requirement that the pre-tense
expression is the main predicate. Putting all of this togther, we in effect end up with just
the reading given in the ‘identificational operator’ in (5). That is, the overall effect of the
‘focus position’ is (i) to abstract the denotation of its occupant from the normal meaning
of the sentence, (ii) via a process of inference, to bind the remainder with an iota (rather
than merely a lambda) and (iii) to apply the predicative reading of the ‘focus position’
8Alternatively, one might assume a shift from 〈e,〈e, t〉〉 to 〈e, t〉, Partee’s BE. This would not affect my
main point.
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expression to this iota-expression.
For example, the interpretation of (15)(15-a) involves a grammatically encoded
requirement to read Marit as the main predicate. It is therefore (lambda-)abstracted
away from the compositional semantics of the rest of the sentence and given essentially
the reading ‘be Mari’. This remainder, being inferred to relate to ‘that which is to be
identified’ is understood to represent ‘the thing(s) that Ja´nos will see’ (and note how the
selection of this as the term for the main predicate is practically forced in this case by
the presence of accusative case-marking in Marit). The resulting reading is therefore
essentially that of The entity that Ja´nos will see is Mari.
The idea that the Hungarian ‘focus position’ is essentially predicative receives
independent support from the distribution of quantified noun phrases across different
positions in the Hungarian sentence. The data are somewhat complex but boil down
to the observation that intersective quantifiers can appear in FP, while lexically simple
proportional quantifiers cannot, unless they are to be interpreted with contrastive focus
on the restrictor noun. Intersective quantifiers are notably those that can be thought of
as cardinality predicates; lexically simple proportional quantifiers cannot, and as such
fail to provide a potential main predicate. A phrasal proportional quantifier, meanwhile,
allows for the possibility that one of its constituent words is taken to provide the required
predicate (for reasons of space, the reader is referred to Wedgwood, 2005, Chapter 5 for
more details).
For present purposes, the point of all of this is simply to give one reasonably
detailed illustration, from within the domain of putative focus phenomena, of how very
similar interpretations may arise from different kinds of linguistically encoded meaning.
It is not necessary posit common underlying structure to account for such similarities.
As noted above, there are also significant differences between the it-cleft and FP and the
present proposals fit well with these also. While both constructions tend to be associated
with a presuppositional, identificational reading, in my analysis this is intrinsic to the
basic compositional semantics of the it-cleft, while it is something that merely follows
by inference (albeit regularly) from a more basic semantic procedure in the case of FP.
Given this, it is natural that the it-cleft should be more marked in contexts such as the
reply to a Wh-question. The Hungarian construction is compatible with any context
in which its implicit presupposition happens to be satisfied, whereas use of the it-cleft
constitutes a more active move on the part of the speaker to introduce the identificational
reading (hence its typical infelicity in aWh-question context).
3 Losing focus on a cross-linguistic view
This section takes a much broader and shallower perspective than the previous one,
merely noting a number of further examples of the existence of variation in what gets
called ‘focus’ in different languages (for reasons of space, in several cases I just mention
claims from the literature; I refer the reader to the cited works for examples). Even this
small number of illustrations is, I believe, sufficient to cast serious doubt over the via-
bility of ‘focus’ as a unitary cross-linguistic notion. The final section of the paper will
address on a more philosophical level why the assumption of any such notion would be
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mistaken in any case.
As noted in section 1, Somali has been presented as having a ‘focus morpheme’,
baa. Examples like (3) apparently bear a close resemblance to Hungarian ‘focus move-
ment’ (on a conventional understanding of that phenomenon), insofar as both correspond
to ‘narrow’ (or ‘argument’) focus and relate to a sense of contrast or exhaustivity. How-
ever, consideration of a broader range of examples shows that the baa has other, quite
distinct uses. Lecarme (1999) shows how baa can mark what by pretty much any defi-
nition are topics, in addition to foci:
(17) a´rdaygan
this.student
baa
F
wuxuu
expl-F
do´onayaa
wants
ı´nuu
comp
arko´
see
warqa´ddiisa
his.note
‘This student wants to see his notes.’
Lecarme argues that baa can mark both contrastive and non-contrastive topics. This is
debatable given the examples Lecarme presents (as is perhaps inevitable: it is hard to see
how contrast can ever be fully divorced from the business of predication and assertion,
for standardly Gricean reasons). The way might just be open therefore to maintain at
least an analysis in the style of Vallduvı´ and Vilkuna (1998), whereby baa could be
considered a marker of contrast (or ‘kontrast’), which might separately combine with
focus and topic features. Note, however, that even this kind of analysis would have
to recognise that this contrast feature would be manifested in the grammar in a rather
different way than in other languages: Lecarme points out that baa can be attached to an
expletive element, as in (18) (where it is manifested as the allomorph bu´u), and thereby
in effect fails to attach to the point of contrast within the VP, which in this case is the
verb meaning itself:
(18) A: (sa´aka)
today
wax
thing
ma´
Q
akhriyay?
read
‘Did he read (today)?’
(19) B: Ma´ya,
No
wax
thing
bu´u
F
qoray
wrote
‘No, he wrote’ (lit. ‘No, he wrote THING’)
The Siberian language Even is another that appears to use the same morphological mark-
ing on narrow foci and on contrastive topics. Again, this might be taken as support for a
grammatical primitive relating to contrast, but again it has idiosyncratic properties that
undermine any simple claim of universality. Matic´ (2007) reports that the relevant suf-
fix in Even relates not to just any sense of contrast but specifically to closed sets of
alternatives, typically with just two members. This is notably quite different to many
other kinds of putative contrast marking—including the situation in Somali described
above, where potentially open sets of alternatives make it difficult even to judge whether
a baa-marked topic is contrastive or not.
While Somali and Even appear to grammaticalise (different) meanings that cut
across the traditional information-structural categories of topic and focus, Aghem seem-
ingly grammaticalises a multitude of distinctions that roughly fall within traditional def-
initions of focus, thus undermining the unity of the notion of focus from the opposite
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direction. Watters (1979) (cited in Bearth, 1999) claims that complex interactions of
morphology and word order allow Aghem to encode all of the following distinctly: (i)
information (‘assertive’) focus, (ii) corrective (‘counter-assertive’) focus (i.e. ‘X, not
Y, is P’), (iii) ‘counter-assertive polar’ focus (i.e. assertion of a proposition following
its denial), (iv) focus that allows an inference to be drawn, as in ‘they gave the dogs
[F porridge] (and that’s why they are sick)’. Of this list, only (i) fits straightforwardly
into existing universalist theories of focus. Note that even (ii) looks subtly different to
other kinds of ‘contrastive focus’ (going by Watters’ description).
It is notable that Aghem has been cited as a ‘focus movement’ language along-
side Hungarian, as support for the existence of a focus position in universal grammar
(E´. Kiss, 1995). Yet the details of focus-related phenomena in this language speak of
considerable cross-linguistic diversity, rather than of language-specific exploitation of a
common focus primitive.
Luganda is a language that seems to mark focus straightforwardly, if one only
considers simple question-answer cases. In this case, the language appears to mark the
part of a sentence that answers a Wh-question by the absence of a certain prefix, tradi-
tionally known as an ‘augment’. This might be dealt with by the assumption that focus
licenses the absence of the augment (as Hyman and Katamba, 1993 argue), but this phe-
nomenon once again proves to have very different properties to those associated with
focus in more widely studied languages. For example, Hyman and Katamba (1993) note
that this putative focus-marking is neutralised within the scope of negation; something
which they note to be “quite pervasive in African languages”, but which is not charac-
teristic of more widely discussed ‘focus-marking’ phenomena. Also, the presence of an
adverb in a non-negative main clause necessitates would-be ‘focus-marking’ (i.e. the
absence of an expected augment) on some constituent within the clause, even if the in-
terpretation is predicate (or VP-) focus. Most unexpectedly for a focus-marking device,
the relevant distinction is neutralised in the case of proper nouns, which always lack the
augment, and demonstratives, which always carry the augment. Perhaps relatedly, Hy-
man and Katamba note that the augment can often be translated with a definite article
(though they argue convincingly that it is not one).
Whatever the proper description of the augment is, these properties strongly sug-
gest that it cannot be simply defined in terms of a category of focus that is also operative
in phenomena like English accenting, or indeed Hungarian ‘focus movement’. Yet it
does overlap substantially with traditional notions of focus, including passing the key
test of marking the answer to aWh-question. Taken together, these facts imply similarity
of effects, rather than identity of (grammatical) causes.
As a final point on Luganda, note that even if one could justify the idea that this is
‘focus’ in some meaningful sense, it would have to interact with the rest of the grammar
in ways that differ from other languages. For example, Hyman and Katamba show that
interpretations that might be called predicate (or VP-) focus, polarity focus and focus
on tense or aspect all correspond to one linguistic form. This is not what we would
expect from other cases of putative focus-marking, including both English accenting
and Hungarian ‘focus movement’, where such interpretive distinctions are associated
with quite different linguistic forms.
Variation in Focus 113
Finally, English shows the inadequacy of ‘focus’, or related primitive notions, in
the face of the diversity of relevant phenomena within just a single language. Consider
the case of ‘focus fronting’, as in the second part of (20) (an utterance attributed to Jerry
Fodor by Prince, 1999):
(20) Let’s assume there’s a device which can do it—a parser let’s call it.
Vallduvı´ and Engdahl (1996) rightly note that this has different properties to focus-by-
accent, but claim that it still fits nicely within their universalist view of ‘information
packaging’: on this view, the fronted expression instantiates both a ‘Link’ (essentially, a
contrastive topic) and a ‘Focus’; that is, it sets up a background ‘set or scale’ and then
picks out an element of that set or scale. But note that this would describe any focused
item that may be read contrastively and therefore fails to provide sufficient conditions for
the use of fronting. Furthermore, Prince (1998, 1999) has shown this kind of construction
to be subject to subtle kinds of variation, cross-linguistically and cross-dialectally, above
and beyond what we could call ‘contrastive focus’. Thus, Vallduvı´ and Engdahl’s attempt
to squeeze this construction into a universally applicable schema actively suppresses an
accurate characterisation of its particular properties. It is easy to see that the risk of
significant distortion of the empirical picture is high when such an approach is scaled up
to the level of cross-linguistic analysis.
4 Assumptions of universality
Some readers may be unmoved by the above demonstrations of variation in putative
focus phenomena. It might be argued that such variation is merely superficial—or, at
any rate, that we should entertain the idea that it might be so. Moreover, it is key to any
scientific endeavour to seek to make unifying generalisations through bold hypotheses,
not simply to accept and re-describe the data. Is it not therefore the correct way to
proceed to assume that there is a universal category of focus unless and until it is shown
to be otherwise?
The answer is no, for a number of reasons. First, it is quite unclear what could
falsify such a supposition, if not the kind of ‘superficial’ evidence presented above. I
will not pursue this point, however, as this is not the place to delve into the details of
falsificationist philosophy of science. Here, I am more interested in the following points:
(i) it matters which generalisations we try to make and (ii) comparison with parallel
cases in the natural sciences shows the approach to universal categories described in the
previous paragraph to be a fallacy.
(i) is a crucial corollary to the mantra that we should ‘pursue the strongest hy-
pothesis’. Many absurd hypotheses could be described as being ‘strong’. Meanwhile,
the notion of comparing the strength of hypotheses implies that we have already identi-
fied a coherent, appropriate domain about which to hypothesise. Is this really the case
when we speak of notions like focus in a cross-linguistic context?
Here the accusation of dealing in superficial phenomena cuts both ways. If we
seek to identify those things that are so fundamental as to underlie the structures of all
human languages, we should be wary of taking surface effects, albeit ones that appear in
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similar forms across different languages, and reifying them as theoretically significant
atomic entities. Surface similarities are of course there to be explained, and we can all
agree that doing so means making generalisations; it does not follow that the relevant
generalisations should be stated in terms of the observed similarities. Whatever is truly
common to all languages need not bear much resemblance to the effects that it ultimately
produces. Therefore, to question notions like universal focus features on the basis of ob-
served cross-linguistic variation does not constitute an unscientific refusal to go beyond
superficial data; on the contrary, it implies a demand for a higher degree of abstraction:
a greater separation of surface effects from underlying causes.
This point could of course be applied to linguistic theory more generally, but at
this stage I want to emphasise that the properties of focus make it a notion that is par-
ticularly prone this criticism. Those properties that are typically ascribed to focus are
generally associated with domains that lie outside linguistic structure, but interact with
it (focus is, after all, regularly described as an ‘interface phenomenon’). Thus, ‘newness’
or noteworthiness clearly pertain to broader, extra-linguistic faculties of information pro-
cessing and to general cognitive issues of salience and selective focus of attention. Even
related ideas that have been modelled in terms of logical semantic formalism, like asser-
tion and contrast (or more loosely the relevance of alternatives), are essentially matters
of communication and of information processing, rather than being necessarily matters
of linguistic competence. Moreover, these ideas are truly fundamental within their re-
spective extra-linguistic domains.
It is therefore not a priori necessary to invoke a linguistic primitive (such as
a grammatical feature) to explain any given ‘focusing effect’ in a given language, let
alone to explain the existence of a number of similar effects cross-linguistically. It is
hard to imagine how linguistic communication could occur without ideas like newness
and contrast seeming significant, even if no language were formally sensitive to them
within its grammar. Note that this is not to deny that grammars may be sensitive to such
notions—it is always a logical possibility that a given language may conventionalise a
particular aspect of communication—but certainly it does not take a universal linguistic
primitive to explain how languages regularly appear to show a concern for such matters.
Let us now turn to point (ii) from above. In comparable scientific domains we
unproblematically assume many kinds of ‘category’ to be rather loose: descriptively
useful labels rather than minimal and invariant theoretical objects.
For example, an obvious analogy to the study of comparable phenomena across
different languages is that of comparable biological organs across different animal species.
Some organs may be truly very similar in a wide variety of species, constructed from
similar proteins as well as performing closely comparable functions. Others, however,
may show significant variation at all levels while still being recognisably part of the same
general ‘category’ of organ. The eye is an example of the latter kind of organ. As Land
and Fernald (1992) describe, the animal world contains a rich variety of solutions to the
problem of perceiving the outside world via the processing of light, from the pinhole
camera-like eyes of the chambered nautilus to the complex interaction of cornea, lens
and retina in eyes like those of humans. Both of these contrast with the compound eyes
of flies: arrays of individual image-processing units which must interface with the brain
in such a way that a composite picture is perceived. In addition to such gross morpho-
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logical differences, eyes plainly differ in function, some being adapted (for example)
to process subtle colour distinctions or or provide sharply focused images at consid-
erable distances, while others may provide only crude impressions of light and shade.
The material composition of eyes is also subject to significant variation: Land and Fer-
nald describe how some are apparently evolutionary innovations for optical use, while in
some species proteins have identifiably been co-opted from use in other tissues in ances-
tor species. This reminds us that variation in eyes across species is attributable not only
to divergence and specialisation over time but also to convergence, eyes having evolved
independently several times in the history of animal life.
Far from requiring us to assume identity until shown otherwise, the sensible and
fruitful scientific approach to the business of understanding eyes clearly involves recog-
nition of the value of descriptive labels that cover broadly similar physical forms with
broadly similar functions. Useful as the term ‘eye’ is in cross-species comparison, it
does not describe the same thing in each of its uses, nor is variation in eyes best under-
stood as parameterisation or as the result of combinations of a small number of primitive
elements (note that one could make essentially the same argument regarding, say, ‘lens’
as I am making regarding ‘eye’).
There is in fact one level at which a large proportion of the animal world’s eyes
are to some extent unified: the level of genes. There are surprising commonalities at
this level9. It seems that certain bits of genetic coding relevant to the production of
eyes have been co-opted repeatedly in the course of evolutionary history. Does this in
any way swing the analogy back in favour of universal notions of linguistic focus? Not
really. Note how far removed the genetic level is from any of the observable properties
of a given manifestation of the notion of ‘eye’. There is no chain of reasoning from the
surface similarities of some species’ eyes to the existence of certain sequences of DNA
that many species genuinely have in common. A mouse’s eye is still emphatically not
the same entity as a fly’s eye. Nor would assuming that they were the same have helped
in making the relevant genetic discovery (though recognising very broad functional and
formal similarity undoubtedly was involved). In any case, it is entirely unclear what
could be the analogue of the genetic level when it comes to discussions of linguistic
structure.
One thing that is clear is that a notion like focus, which is so closely drawn
from observable form and meaning, could not be considered analogous to shared genetic
material. Bringing together the strands of argumentation in this section, the role of the
genetic level within the broader analogy with cross-species comparison points up how
positing a universal notion like focus constitutes the reification of an observed effect of
language structure and use, at an essentially arbitrary level of detail—and indeed one
that is suspiciously superficial. The biological analogy shows that the level at which
similar-looking phenomena really share the same material may, at least in principle, be
at many removes from observable phenomena—if they truly share anything at all.
The degree to which putative ‘focusing phenomena’ across and within languages
really resemble each other, let alone work with the same grammatical primitives, is in
the end a wholly empirical matter. It will not be clarified by working to an assumption
9Thus, Halder et al. (1995) report that relevant sections of mouse gene spliced into a fly’s DNA can
cause normal fly eyes (not mouse eyes) to grow on different parts of the fly’s body.
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of maximum similarity. Above, I have given some reasons to believe that such resem-
blances are limited, though nonetheless interesting. While much further cross-linguistic
comparison and detailed analysis is undoubtedly required, this strongly suggests that our
approach to explaining such phenomena should move beyond the simplistic approach of
reifying focus (or a minimal set of related notions) as a part of the grammar; instead
recognising it to be a cover term for numerous effects of grammars and their uses.
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